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Abstract
Economic development and growth depend on growing levels of resource use, and result in environmental impacts from
large scale resource extraction and emissions of waste. In this study, we examine the resource dependency of economic
activities over the past several decades for a set of countries comprising developing, emerging and mature industrialized
economies. Rather than a single universal industrial development pathway, we find a diversity of economic dependencies
on material use, made evident through cluster analysis. We conduct tests for relative and absolute decoupling of the
economy from material use, and compare these with similar tests for decoupling from carbon emissions, both for single
countries and country groupings using panel analysis. We show that, over the longer term, emerging and developing
countries tend to have significantly larger material-economic coupling than mature industrialized economies (although this
effect may be enhanced by trade patterns), but that the contrary is true for short-term coupling. Moreover, we demonstrate
that absolute dematerialization limits economic growth rates, while the successful industrialization of developing countries
inevitably requires a strong material component. Alternative development priorities are thus urgently needed both for
mature and emerging economies: reducing absolute consumption levels for the former, and avoiding the trap of resource-
intensive economic and human development for the latter.
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Introduction
The environmental consequences of international economic
growth and development have led to increasingly high profile
academic and policy debates, with some protagonists calling for a
transition to a ‘‘green economy’’ [1], and others for a complete
change in focus away from economic growth [2][3]. The physical
dependency of both developing and industrialized economies on
environmental resources, in the form of materials and energy, is a
key aspect of this debate. Indeed, if economic development can be
somehow decoupled from environmental resources, environmental
impacts would be strongly reduced, and the risk of global
environmental catastrophes potentially mitigated or averted.
Economic activity inevitably entails the use of natural resources,
but the scale depends on the structure and technical efficiency of
economic processes. As a result, many industrialized countries
have instituted policies encouraging such decoupling, for instance
by setting targets decreasing the material intensity of economic
activity [4–6]. At best, however, these targets result in a relative
rather than absolute decoupling of the economy and its physical
basis, and at worst, they simply reward business-as-usual efficiency
improvements [7]. It is thus important to understand the history
and past trends of material and energy dependency of economies,
as well as to distinguish carefully between the development
trajectories of countries which are still emerging as industrialized
countries, and those which have long completed their industrial
transition.
Researchers have offered several competing theories of envi-
ronmental dependency of economies in the context of industrial-
ization, development and globalised trade. In early stages of
development, agricultural activities dominate, and biomass is the
most important resource category [8,9]. During the process of
industrialization, biomass extraction and use remains roughly
constant (although the economic and workforce shares of
agriculture decline through expansion of other sector and
mechanization and intensification respectively), while minerals,
including construction materials and metals, and technical energy,
including fossil fuels, increase dramatically [10]. The ultimate
outcome of global development and trade is disputed: some
researchers see strong evidence for convergence in economic
dependency on energy [11], which can be related to the theory of
technical lock-in of dominant technologies [12], whereas others
emphasize that the global division of labor between extraction,
manufacturing and consumption activities, shown dramatically by
Davis and colleagues [13], acts as a systemic barrier to
development [14], and may result in environmental conflicts [15].
Once a country has attained a high level of economic and
industrial development, some theories state that a combination of
factors could lead to the absolute dematerialization and decarbo-
nization of the economy. These factors are generally described as
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(i) structural shifts in production and consumption patterns (often
known as the transition to a ‘‘service economy’’, although this
transition is disputed [16]), (ii) high technical capacity (leading to
more efficient use of resources), (iii) surplus resources to devote to
environmental protection [17,18], and/or (iv) economic prefer-
ences for outsourcing labor-intensive (and possibly pollution-
intensive or primary commodity-intensive) activities [19]. Togeth-
er, these phenomena could be expected to lead to an ‘‘Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve’’ or EKC, where environmental impacts
first grow, then decrease with income, in the shape of an inverted-
U. Past studies have found strong evidence for EKC behavior for
certain categories of pollutants, which tend to have in common
that their impacts are local and immediate, while their abatement
is technically straightforward and low cost [18,20]. Since materials
and energy use, along with carbon emissions, do not fit this
characterization, there is no reason to believe that they should be
subject to the EKC phenomenon. Past studies have found mixed
evidence for an EKC for materials [21–23]. The EKC studies for
carbon are too numerous to cite here, but also show mixed
evidence, along with methodological [24] and accounting issues
related to trade [25]. Indeed, consumption-based carbon emis-
sions, which include carbon embodied in traded goods and
services, show less evidence for an EKC than territorial emissions,
for instance [26]. All consumption-based studies demonstrate that
developing countries (non-OECD, non-Annex B) are net exporters
of both materials and greenhouse gases to industrialized countries,
with traded volumes increasing over time [27,28].
In this article, we analyze material consumption and carbon
emissions from both developing and industrialized countries over
almost four decades (1970–2005) to identify commonalities and
divergences in economic dependency on environmental resources,
and offer robust conclusions concerning the potential for absolute
decoupling of economic activities from environmental resources.
This study is innovative, since it constitutes the largest study of
economic dependency on material use in terms of the number of
countries, their diversity in development status, and time span
covered. For the first time, we include a simple time trend
alongside income dependency terms. We investigate total mate-
rials, divided into biomass and minerals & fossil fuels, and conduct
a full parallel analysis on carbon emissions. We start by describing
our data and methods in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the
results of our analysis, starting with a cluster analysis to
quantitatively determine the development status of countries in
our sample, followed by the country-by-country analysis of
economic-material coupling trajectories, and culminating a full
panel analysis. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of the
findings for our understanding of the coupling between economy
and resource use, and in Section 5 we conclude that a shift away
from industrial development and towards development focused on
human well-being is necessary.
Materials and Methods
Data
Material use. Economy wide material flow accounts provide
information on material extraction, trade and consumption in
national economies. For this study we have used domestic material
consumption (DMC) as the appropriate indicator. DMC measures
apparent consumption and is defined as domestic extraction plus
imports minus exports of materials [29,30].
In recent years material flow data has been compiled for an
increasing number of national economies, and the quality of
economy wide material flow data has greatly improved. Consistent
and comparable information on DMC in time series is now
available [30]. For this study we sourced the data required for 39
countries plus the world, from two existing economy-wide MFA
databases. The MFA database maintained at the Institute of Social
Ecology provided published and unpublished economy-wide MFA
data for a set of countries in Europe, North and Latin America,
Africa and Asia. Published data from this source includes data for
the EU-15 member states [31], the USA [32], Japan [33], India
[34], Brazil [35], and the global total [8]. The second database
used was the CSIRO and UNEP dataset which covers countries in
the Asian-Pacific region, available online at www.csiro.au/
AsiaPacificResourceFlows. Previously published work which uses
this latter database includes [36,37]; See File S1for a list of all
included countries and sources. All MFA country time series used
in this study were constructed using the same methodological
principles, referring to guidelines developed by Eurostat [38] and
employing state-of-the-art adaptations of accounting procedures
for non-European countries. MFA data are compiled on the basis
of national and international statistical sources and standardized
procedures to account for extraction of and trade with the main
material groups biomass, fossil energy carriers, ores and non-
metallic minerals. Adaptations for non European countries, for
example, concern the assumptions used to estimate biomass flows
not covered in statistical sources such as used crop residues or
grazed biomass [39]. Due to the high degree of methodological
standardisation and the quality of the underlying primary data the
comparability of MFA data both across countries and over time is
high, as has been shown by Fischer-Kowalski et al [40].
In our analysis we subdivide DMC into two main material
groups: biomass and minerals and fossil fues. Biomass includes
harvested crops, crop residues and forage, biomass grazed by
livestock, timber and fuel wood. Minerals and fossil fuels include
metal ores, non-metallic minerals (including sand and gravel for
construction) and fossil energy carriers. These groupings are used
as they have been shown to have distinct relationships with
population and economic development [7,8,10,41].
CO2 emissions. Data on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel
combustion and cement production was taken from the CDIAC
database [42].
Gross domestic product (GDP) and population. Data on
GDP in constant US Dollars of 2005 and population was taken
from the United Nations National Accounts Database [43].
The temporal coverage of the data is 1970–2005, except for the
DMC indicators of the EU-15, Argentina and Cuba until 2004,
1980–2003 for Canada, and 1972 onwards for CO2 for
Bangladesh and Pakistan.
The use of DMC and GDP as environmental and economic
indicators can be criticized. Cleveland and Ruth [44], among
others, discuss the weakness of aggregating materials based on
weight, rather than economic value or environmental impact, for
example. However, DMC is intended to measure bulk materials,
not specialized or highly polluting materials like neodymium or
plutonium, and any non mass-based weighting system would be
open to other criticisms, as well as being impractical to assemble
credibly for an international database over many decades. On the
economic side, GDP has been thoroughly discredited as indicator
of wellbeing, with high profile initiatives calling for alternative
measures [45]. However, GDP is an indicator of total economic
activity, and this aspect is what we seek to understand in this
article. The values of key indicators for the countries in our sample
are shown for 2005 in File S1.
Methods
Our analysis is conducted using three separate quantitative
methods: a cluster analysis for identifying country placement in the
Development and Dematerialization
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developing/emerging/industrialized hierarchy; regression analysis
on individual countries over time for each material category; and
finally a full econometric panel analysis conducted on different
samples of countries, for each material category. It is worth noting
that we conduct all of these analyses on per capita values, i.e.
‘metabolic rates’ [30] rather than including population separately
as a contributing variable. This is done in order to simplify the
analysis to quantities which are comparable across countries, and
to avoid the issues arising from the interpretation of differing
population coefficients in different methods [46–48].
Country groupings: cluster analysis. We conduct cluster
analysis to determine development status groupings of the
countries in our sample,based on income and per capita material
use, both static values and dynamic growth rates. The clustering is
based on the average linkage between all pairs of objects in any
two clusters, and standardized Euclidean distances in order to
make the dimensions unitless and cover the same range. Further
details are available in File S1.
Individual country trajectories. Each country in our
sample faces a unique set of circumstances and events. It is thus
interesting to consider the coupling between material use per
capita (the metabolic rate) and economic growth (measured as
GDP per capita) of each country over time. This is done by
measuring the coefficient of log-linear coupling given by the linear-
least-squares regression
log(mit)~aizbi:log(yit) ð1Þ
Where mit is the metabolic rate (DMC per capita) and yit is the
income (GDP per capita) of country i at time t.
The coupling coefficient b is of particular significance; it is the
income elasticity of consumption [49] of a country: in other words it
measures the strength and magnitude of the coupling between its
economy and resource use. Indeed b quantifies the growth in
material use per capita for a given growth in income. For example,
if b=1, material use per capita will grow exactly proportionally to
income, but if b=0.5, material use per capita will only grow at half
the rate of income growth. Values of income elasticity between 1
and 0 thus correspond to relative decoupling: material use grows
with the economy, but not as fast as GDP growth. Absolute
decoupling occurs when the income elasticity is below 0: then the
physical dependency of the economy actually declines with
economic growth. It should be noted that this definition of
decoupling applies only to GDP and material use per capita, and
thus does not take population growth into account: if population
grows at an annual rate p, the condition for relative decoupling
translates roughly to 1.p+b.0, and becomes p+b,0 for absolute
decoupling.
Econometric approach and panel analysis. To add to the
insights gained by the cluster analysis groupings and material-
economy coupling of individual countries, we conduct a full
econometric panel analysis of the time series data. In a first step,
we test for specific time series attributes: whether the time series
follow a stable (stationary) path, or whether they develop
according to a unit root process (with stable growth). As our data
consists of time series for a broad range of countries, we explore
whether the time series follow stationary paths or root unit
processes by means of different panel stationarity tests (such as
Panel ADF tests). These tests examine whether the time series of a
given variable for different countries in the sample follow a
common path (e.g. a common trend), or whether they develop
independently from one another.
There are several methodological approaches available for
panel data such as the one considered here; Stern (2010) presents
estimations methods for panel data such as OLS (linear, quadratic,
with/without time trend) and compares these to models including
fixed and random effects, and between estimates. There are
different econometric methodological problems involved with the
different approaches, which may lead to differing values of the
coefficients. In light of the econometric discussion, we chose the
current approach, although it is clear that our results may change
with the application of other econometric estimation procedures
and models.
From a methodological point of view, simply regressing two
non-stationary time series on each other might lead to spurious
regressions, indicating that two variables are significantly corre-
lated, while in fact the relationship is non-existent. Thus, the
stationarity tests not only produce substantial results regarding the
development of the different time series, but are also important for
the next steps of the methodological approach.
As a second step, we test for the cointegration of the explanatory
as well as dependent variables. Our research goal is to investigate
the coupling of resource use (e.g. DMC per capita) and economic
development (GDP per capita). We therefore test whether resource
use and economic development variables are ‘‘cointegrated’’, i.e.
whether they run parallel (meaning that the residuals of a bilateral
(cointegrating) regression are stationary).
If the variables are cointegrated, it can be concluded that they
are indeed correlated; for instance, if economic activity and
resource use are cointegrated, GDP might very well determine
DMC (or vice versa). When estimating this relation, serial
correlation (the correlation of a time series variable with itself
over time) might constitute a major problem; in order to avoid
distorted coefficients, estimations should include the appropriate
autoregressive terms to correct for serial correlation.
We expect the correlation between GDP and resource use to
follow certain development paths, and the time series to include
both long-term trends and dependencies, and short term
fluctuations. Due to technological choices, a locked-in path may
be mirrored by a rather stable long-term correlation between GDP
and resource use, since many technologies cannot be changed in
the short term. However, short-term fluctuations in national GDP
or industrial production values may certainly lead to coefficients
that are very different from the long-term relations. All analyses
will also be done for the whole sample (accounting for
heteroscedasticity by appropriate weighting), as well as for specific
groupings of countries based on development status determined
through the cluster analysis. We also test for the presence of a
quadratic term (corresponding to Environmental Kuznets Curve
behavior if it is negative), and for a simple time-related trend.
As a consequence, the equation used in the panel regressions is
as follows:
log(mit)~azaizb:log(yit)zc: log(yit){MLI½ 2
zd:AR(1)(ze:time)
ð2Þ
Where mit and yit are the material use per capita and GDP per
capita, respectively, of country i at time t, and MLI=mean(log(y))
is a constant included to prevent co-linearity between the linear
and quadratic income terms [50]. AR(1) is the autoregressive term
used to correct for serial correlation. We use pooled EGLS
(estimated general least squares) with White cross-section standard
errors and covariance.
The results of the panel analysis are then the general and
country-specific constants a and ai, the linear income coefficient b
(analogous to the income elasticity of consumption in the
individual country analysis described above), the quadratic income
Development and Dematerialization
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coefficient c, and if it is included in the analysis, the linear time
trend coefficient e. In terms of the EKC analysis, the peak income
is given by:
log(yPEAK )~MLI{b=2c: ð3Þ
Whether or not the detection of a quadratic term is a proof of
delinking (inverted U) or relinking (U) depends on the statistical
significance of the coefficient c, obtained from the Student T-test.
Moreover, the peak income should be within the range of the
incomes existing in the sample: otherwise, only one half of the U
(i.e. no U at all) has been observed.
Results and Discussion
Industrialized, emerging, developing and delayed
countries
The main goal of this work is to characterize the differences
between mature industrialized countries, which already attained
high levels of economic activity and resource use in 1970, at the
start of our study period, and countries at other stages in their
development: emerging, developing, or simply discontinuous or
disrupted. For many countries, the attribution to one group or
another is straightforward, but several countries have an
intermediate or ambiguous status. We therefore use cluster
analysis to define two quantitatively robust country groups.
Traditionally, socio-economic indicators, especially GDP per
capita, are used to describe and compare the development status of
individual countries. At the core of our research, however, we are
interested in the physical and environmental aspects of socio-
economic development and industrialization, represented by
material consumption per capita (the metabolic rate). When
maturing, economies change their resource base which is known as
the ‘‘metabolic transition’’ of countries [9,51]. We thus include
material consumption, measured as DMC per capita, alongside
economic development, measured as GDP per capita, in our
analysis.
The definition of industrialized and developing economies
represents a moving target; it changes over time. An income
qualifying a country as industrialized in 1970 may not be sufficient
in 2004. The status of a country must thus be considered within a
specific time period. We thus conduct two separate analyses: at the
beginning of the time span of our data, in 1970, and at the end in
2004. This also enables us to detect countries which change status,
from developing to industrialized, or vice-versa, over the decades
covered in our data.
Because we are interested in development trajectories as well as
development status, we define the country clusters in terms of their
dynamic (material and economic) growth rates, as well as their
material and economic status. From this analysis, which is detailed
in File S1, we identify several distinct groups of countries,
summarized in Table 1 under three broad categories: ‘‘Mature,’’
‘‘Emerging,’’ and ‘‘Developing.’’ The ‘‘Emerging’’ category is the
most interesting and mixed, ranging from countries which would
have been considered industrialized in 1970, but no longer in
2004, to fast developers, with an inverse trend.
In the remainder of our analysis, we combine the 2nd and 3rd
groups in Table 1 as ‘‘Emerging/Developing’’ countries. Indeed,
we expect the economic-material coupling of the ‘‘successful
developers’’ and ‘‘still emerging’’ countries to have similarities with
the ‘‘developing’’ group, since they theoretically represent stages
along the development trajectory. The ‘‘Mature’’ (mostly moving
across) and ‘‘Emerging/Developing’’ (mostly moving upwards)
groups are shown in terms of their GDP and DMC per capita at
the beginning and end of the time series in Figure 1.
We generally expect mature industrialized countries to be
distinguished by high levels of economic activity and material
consumption, and relatively slow growth rates in both dimensions,
while developing and emerging countries would have lower
economic and material status, but higher growth rates. Interme-
diate countries would exhibit various mismatches between their
levels of wealth/consumption and growth rates. This is the overall
behavior observed in Figure 1. Income plays a larger role than
material use in determining the status of a country, as is evident
from the clear horizontal separation and significant vertical
overlap of the country groups. The results in the cluster analysis
(Table 1) and trajectories (Figure 1) both show that there is a great
diversity of possible development, in economic and material terms,
and that there is not a single dominant trajectory. This diversity
will be explored further in terms of economic-material coupling in
the next section.
Economic-material coupling for individual countries
In this section, we explore the long-term coupling between the
economic growth of each country and its material consumption by
measuring the income elasticity of material consumption, b in Eq.
1, for each country in our sample, over the entire period.
Examples of economic-material coupling are shown in Figure 2 for
China (strongly positively coupled) and Germany (strongly
decoupled). This first analysis shows that individual countries
follow very diverse trajectories, which have to be understood in
terms of each country’s circumstances.
For each country, we thus obtain an economic-material
coupling coefficient quantifying the level of material dependency
of its economic growth. This is done for total materials, as well as
the mineral/fossil and biomass components separately, and
compared with values for CO2 per capita. The results are
summarized in Table 2.
We find that mature countries generally have lower economic-
material coupling coefficients than developing countries, and
sometimes even have significant negative coefficients, indicating
absolute decoupling, in particular Germany, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom. Absolute decoupling can have complex and
diverse causes: the recent dematerialization of the UK is mostly
due to the decline of the manufacturing and construction sectors
[52], with much of these activities being displaced overseas, as
evidenced by the growth in its consumption-based emissions [53].
In contrast, in Germany, dematerialization is due to a combina-
tion of changes in energy composition, the decline in the use of
construction minerals, and the collapse of polluting industries in
the former GDR [54] – moreover, Germany is one of few Annex
B countries with declining consumption-based emissions [28].
Interestingly, low economic-material coupling can also be seen in
some of the developing economies, such as Colombia and the
Philippines which in the case of Colombia was enabled by a
significant increase in fossil fuel exports which drive GDP growth
but don’t have a large signal in DMC. This may also be explained
by a high share of biomass in DMC, high population growth and
declining biomass use per capita. Curiously, fossil exporter
Venezuela is the only developing or emerging country with a
large negative coupling between income and carbon emissions. In
fact, over the period of our study, Venezuelan incomes declined, as
did material consumption (Figure 1), while carbon emissions
continued to rise.
Importantly, the group of successful developers constituted of
Greece, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Spain
(Table 1) is characterized by high levels of economic-material
Development and Dematerialization
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coupling, with b above 0.5 for total DMC/cap, which is a level
only exceeded by Australia in the mature group of countries.
Similarly, with the notable exception of Colombia, the countries
which went from developing to intermediate in Table 1, China,
Indonesia, Thailand, also have material-economic coefficients
above 0.5 i.e. considerable coupling of economic activity and
resource use.
It would be mistaken, however, to conclude that a high
material-economic coupling is a guaranteed recipe for successful
development. Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia, and Turkey did not attain
fully developed status in the 35 years covered by our time series,
despite having consistently high levels of economic-material
coupling. However, these countries started out with incomes
below $3,000 per-capita, whereas the successful developers, with
the exception of the Republic of Korea, started out with incomes
above that level, so it may be a question of having sufficient time
and growth rates to catch up with the mature industrialized
nations.
The different types of materials show different levels of coupling
with economic growth: in general the coupling is largest for
minerals and fossils, followed by carbon emissions and total
materials, with biomass having by far the lowest coupling,
Table 1. Country types based on cluster analysis.
1. Mature industrialized (16)
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA
Special cases: Finland and Australia stand out in terms of their high material consumption.
2. Emerging (17)
Successful developers (attained industrialized status by 2000–04): Greece, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain
Delayed development (belonged to industrialized group in 1970–75): Argentina, Venezuela
Consistently intermediate: Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Iran, Malaysia, Turkey
Faster development (belonged to developing group in 1970–75): China, Colombia, Indonesia and Thailand. China stands out in terms of its economic and material
growth rates in 2000–2004.
3. Developing (6)
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070385.t001
Figure 1. Income and Total Domestic Material Consumption per capita for mature (blue circles), emerging/developing countries
(orange diamonds), and the world (black star), in 1970 (small marker) and 2004 (large marker). (Canada is missing data for 1970.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070385.g001
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corroborating findings from previous studies, which have shown
that biomass use is not related to economic development but much
more to population trends, especially for mature economies
[7,8,10,41]. The levels and direction of material-economic
coupling are by no means consistent across the board for the
different types of materials considered. Most countries in the
developing group have positive material-economic coupling for all
the material categories, including fossil fuels represented by carbon
emissions. In contrast, Colombia and Singapore have significantly
decoupled their economic growth from biomass while increasing
their reliance on minerals and fossils. Among the developed
countries, Belgium and Luxembourg and Sweden have positive
material-economic coupling for biomass (but still very low with
0.2) because of higher rates of timber harvest and high significance
of wood processing industries, but negative for fossil fuels, whereas
Italy and Ireland have weakly negative coupling for biomass, but
positive for minerals and fossil fuels. The highest material-
economic coupling of total DMC and in particular minerals and
fossils in the mature group can be seen for Australia, New Zealand
and Ireland, three countries with high levels of material use
(Figure 1) and large export-oriented primary sectors in the case of
Australia [55] and New Zealand.
What emerges from this analysis is a strongly differentiated
picture of material and economic growth, showcasing the diversity
of industrialization, materialization and development trajectories;
in terms of growth rates, material-economic coupling and material
composition changes. Although broad differences and trends
between the developing and mature countries can be observed,
such as higher economic-material coupling coefficients in the
developing group, and higher coupling for minerals and fossils
rather than biomass, these are far from universal. This analysis
indicates the importance of carefully understanding the history
and circumstances (such as natural resource endowments) of each
country. To be able to identify some general patterns we employ
panel analysis.
Panel analysis
The first step in our panel analysis is to test the data for
stationarity and co-integration. These tests are important in
determining the type of panel analysis to conduct, and indicate
whether there are in fact relations between material consumption
and CO2 emissions and GDP.
The mixed results of the stationary tests (see File S1) confirm the
heterogeneity of the time series data, since the development and
history of the countries vary substantially. However, these results
are not mirrored in the cointegration tests (see File S1) since all
tests – except for mineral and fossils consumption in mature
countries – point to a rather strong cointegrating relationship
between GDP and the dependent variables. These tests support
our hypothesis of significant coupling between GDP and the
environmental indicators material use and CO2 emissions.
From a methodological point of view, we can thus proceed with
panel estimations as presented in Eq. 2, accounting for hetero-
scedasticity by a weighted panel regression. We present estima-
tions both with and without a time trend. The results are
summarized in Table 3.
The most striking result of the panel analysis is the overall
lack of significance of the quadratic income (EKC) coefficients c
– and when these are significant, they are most often positive
(hence the very low ‘‘peak incomes’’, which in those cases are
really ‘‘valley incomes’’), indicating a steadily increasing curve
rather than an inverted U. Indeed, the only resource use
category which exhibits a definite EKC-like behavior are the
CO2 emissions of mature countries, although this may be due to
displacement of carbon-intensive processes [25,26]. However,
the peak incomes, as derived from Eq. 3, are on the very high
end of the sample’s income spectrum, indicating that only the
upward half of the inverted U is observed, with no observed
decline in CO2 emissions at higher incomes. Altogether these
results show no indication of lower resource use at higher or the
highest incomes, quite the contrary: at the most a saturation or
stabilization effect could be inferred for carbon emissions. This
result should not be surprising given the central importance of
fossil-fuels to modern economies.
The linear income coefficient b, in contrast, is the most
significant in Table 3. This coefficient indicates the overall
economic-material coupling in the sample, and can thus be
compared to the values in Table 2 for individual countries. As in
Table 2, the highest values are for mineral and fossil materials,
followed by total materials and carbon emissions, with the lowest
coupling found for biomass. However, there are important
differences between country groups.
Surprisingly, the income-material coupling coefficient for
minerals and fossils measured through panel analysis in Table 3
is significantly larger for mature economies (1.41 and 1.38) than
for emerging and developing economies (1.01 and 0.92, with and
without time trend respectively). This result is in marked
contradiction with the long-term coupling values found for
individual countries in Table 2. To explain this, the panel analysis
coefficient has to be interpreted as a short term coupling value,
Figure 2. Examples of strong positive economic-material
coupling (China, coupling coefficient 0.7), and negative
economic-material coupling (Germany, 20.4). The goodness-of-
fit R2 of the fit curve is also shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070385.g002
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indicating that fluctuations in economic growth rates have an
immediate effect on material use: taken together, these values
mean that mature industrialized countries have lower long-term
economic-material coupling than developing or emerging econo-
mies, but that their economies are more tightly coupled to mineral
and fossil resources in the short term: during economic recessions
or booms, for example.
This is a highly relevant result, since it quantifies the material
resilience of different types of economies over different time scales.
Mature countries, with high per capita levels of mineral and fossil
use, are less resilient to economic-material shocks in the short term
(higher coupling indicating higher interdependency), but more
resilient in the long term (lower coupling indicating lower
dependency); whereas developing and emerging economies are
Table 2. Coupling coefficients of income and material consumption.
Country group Country Total DMC/cap
Mineral and
Fossil DMC/cap Biomass DMC/cap CO2/cap
Emerging/ Algeria 2.4 (.31) 2.7 (.36) 1.2 (.21) 2.0 (.32)
Developing Argentina 0.4 (.20) 1.7 (.15) 0.1 (.27) 0.5 (.07)
Bangladesh 0.9 (.08) 5.1 (.54) 0.0 (.05) 2.2 (.13)
Brazil 0.9 (.05) 1.6 (.09) 0.6 (.05) 0.9 (.09)
China 0.7 (.01) 0.9 (.03) 0.3 (.01) 0.5 (.02)
Colombia 20.0 (.05) 0.8 (.09) 20.4 (.05) 0.0 (.09)
Cuba 0.3 (.22) 0.6 (.20) 0.2 (.25) 0.3 (.12)
Greece 1.8 (.14) 2.5 (.19) 0.1 (.05) 1.5 (.13)
India 0.4 (.01) 1.0 (.02) 20.1 (.01) 1.1 (.05)
Indonesia 0.5 (.03) 1.6 (.06) 0.1 (.02) 1.1 (.03)
Iran 0.3 (.22) 0.3 (.34) 0.2 (.08) 0.9 (.18)
Malaysia 1.0 (.02) 1.5 (.04) 0.5 (.02) 1.2 (.04)
Nepal 0.4 (.06) 5.1 (.69) 0.2 (.02) 3.2 (.18)
Pakistan 0.4 (.02) 0.8 (.04) 0.3 (.03) 1.4 (.02)
Philippines 20.1 (.25) 0.3 (.44) 20.3 (.25) 0.7 (.23)
Portugal 1.2 (.06) 1.6 (.08) 0.4 (.03) 1.4 (.04)
Rep. Korea 0.8 (.03) 0.9 (.03) 0.2 (.02) 0.8 (.01)
Singapore 0.5 (.08) 0.5 (.08) 20.5 (.10) 0.2 (.05)
Spain 0.8 (.03) 0.9 (.04) 0.3 (.03) 0.8 (.04)
Sri Lanka 0.2 (.05) 0.6 (.10) 20.1 (.03) 0.9 (.09)
Thailand 0.8 (.02) 1.3 (.04) 0.3 (.03) 1.4 (.03)
Turkey 0.9 (.09) 1.9 (.28) 20.2 (.04) 1.3 (.04)
Venezuela 0.4 (.13) 0.4 (.23) 0.4 (.08) 20.8 (.14)
Mature Australia 1.0 (.05) 1.3 (.07) 0.2 (.06) 0.6 (.06)
Austria 0.2 (.03) 0.3 (.04) 20.1 (.06) 0.2 (.04)
Belgium and Luxembourg 20.1 (.06) 20.2 (.07) 0.2 (.05) 20.4 (.05)
Canada 20.0 (.08) 20.1 (.10) 0.0 (.08) 0.0 (.04)
Denmark 0.0 (.05) 0.1 (.07) 20.1 (.05) 20.3 (.07)
Finland 0.1 (.06) 0.0 (.07) 0.1 (.06) 0.2 (.06)
France 20.1 (.05) 20.2 (.06) 0.1 (.06) 20.7 (.06)
Germany 20.4 (.04) 20.4 (.04) 20.4 (.06) 20.5 (.05)
Ireland 0.2 (.02) 0.4 (.04) 20.0 (.02) 0.3 (.02)
Italy 0.2 (.03) 0.4 (.04) 20.1 (.03) 0.4 (.02)
Japan 20.1 (.05) 20.1 (.05) 20.1 (.04) 0.3 (.03)
Netherlands 20.2 (.09) 20.2 (.10) 0.0 (.09) 20.1 (.06)
New Zealand 0.2 (.07) 0.6 (.19) 0.0 (.08) 1.1 (.11)
Sweden 0.1 (.08) 0.0 (.11) 0.2 (.06) 21.1 (.09)
United Kingdom 20.2 (.05) 20.2 (.06) 0.0 (.02) 20.3 (.03)
USA 0.0 (.04) 0.1 (.05) 20.2 (.05) 20.1 (.03)
World 0.3 (.03) 0.5 (.04) 20.1 (.02) 0.1 (.04)
Coupling coefficients of income and material consumption given by the income elasticity b in Eq. 1. Negative coefficients are shown in italics. The standard error of the
coefficient is given in ().
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070385.t002
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most vulnerable in the long term, but exhibit more short-term
resilience (lower dependency). There could be several explanations
for this phenomenon: for mature economies, for instance the
importance of the construction sector (responsible for 30–50% of
DMC in industrial economies, and a known driver of material use
[56,57]) in economic cycles may lead to strong short term
dependencies, while their highly developed physical infrastructure
(roads, buildings, other forms of physical capital) enables a long
term relative decoupling of materials use and economy. For
developing and emerging economies, in contrast, long term
economic growth is more clearly dependent on the continuous
development of physical infrastructure and capital, leading to
higher long-term coupling. Another factor could be the type of
economic system (free-market or more politically controlled) of the
two country groups. These explanations, while plausible, are only
conjectures, and should be verified using complementary analysis
in future work.
Trade and globalization may also play a role in these results and
their interpretation. If the materials and carbon embodied in
traded goods and services were taken into account, two outcomes
would be possible. According to the convergence theory, the
differences in couplings and timescales would be smoothed over,
leading to globally uniform economic-material relationships.
According to the global division of labor theory, these distinctions
would not disappear altogether, or in some cases even be
accentuated.
The reversal in short/long term coupling is not seen for fossil
fuels alone, indicated by carbon emissions: in this case of carbon
emissions, the economic coupling coefficient is lower for mature
industrialized countries (0.67 and 0.57) than for developing/
emerging countries (0.71 and 0.69), although the different
coupling values in this case are not as far apart as for the mineral
and fossil materials.
Innovatively, in this panel analysis, we tested the data for
dependency on time alone, separate from economic growth
trends (coefficient e in Eq. 2 and Table 3). In contrast with the
quadratic income coefficient c, this term is always negative, and
almost always significant, implying that material use per capita
tends to decrease over time, once income effects have been
taken into account. The time trend is not significant for
developing and emerging countries, except for biomass and total
materials, but it is significant for all material categories as well as
carbon emissions for the whole sample and for mature
economies.
Table 3. Panel analysis results.
Income
Quadratic
income Time trend R2 adjusted Peak income
Sample Dependent variable b T-stat c T-stat e T-stat (Eq. 3)
All countries Total DMC/cap 0.81 12.78 0.09 8.72 20.017 25.97 0.997 $65
Total DMC/cap 0.77 11.38 0.09 7.23 0.996 $77
Mineral+Fossil DMC/cap 1.21 12.46 0.04 2.09 20.022 25.79 0.994 $0
Mineral+Fossil DMC/cap 1.21 10.23 0.03 0.93 0.993 $0
Biomass DMC/cap 0.25 6.42 0.01 1.59 20.007 27.09 0.996 $0
Biomass DMC/cap 0.15 4.11 0.01 1.32 0.996 $9
CO2/cap 0.73 11.09 0.00 20.03 20.013 22.53 0.999 NaN
CO2/cap 0.64 10.22 20.01 21.04 0.999 1.33E+13
Emerging/ Total DMC/cap 0.58 9.39 0.10 6.36 20.006 22.26 0.995 $137
Developing Total DMC/cap 0.53 9.40 0.10 6.26 0.994 $170
Mineral+Fossil DMC/cap 1.01 9.59 0.06 2.11 20.008 21.73 0.990 $1
Mineral+Fossil DMC/cap 0.92 13.77 0.05 2.00 0.990 $1
Biomass DMC/cap 0.23 5.94 0.02 1.51 20.006 24.47 0.996 $11
Biomass DMC/cap 0.17 4.50 0.03 1.95 0.996 $132
CO2/cap 0.71 12.21 0.01 0.69 20.003 20.88 0.998 $0
CO2/cap 0.69 13.76 0.01 0.56 0.998 $0
Mature Total DMC/cap 1.05 10.63 20.02 20.11 20.022 27.76 0.989 1.70E+14
Total DMC/cap 1.04 10.04 20.34 21.56 0.988 $126,108
Mineral+Fossil DMC/cap 1.41 11.16 0.14 0.61 20.029 26.64 0.982 $202
Mineral+Fossil DMC/cap 1.38 10.53 20.32 21.13 0.981 $232,634
Biomass DMC/cap 0.19 2.70 20.03 20.32 20.005 22.85 0.995 $862,582
Biomass DMC/cap 0.00 20.02 20.04 20.50 0.994 $26,636
CO2/cap 0.67 5.45 20.54 23.40 20.009 22.47 0.992 $49,449
CO2/cap 0.57 5.41 20.78 25.61 0.992 $38,688
Panel analysis results showing the coefficient values (as defined in Eq. 2), corresponding T-statistic and goodness-of-fit R2. Insignificant values are shown in italics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070385.t003
Development and Dematerialization
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 October 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 10 | e70385
The time trend can be interpreted as the short-term time-
dependent (and income-independent) rate of improvement of
material and carbon efficiency, related to technical improvements
rather than economic growth. The value of the time trend
coefficient, in fact, sets a short-term condition for absolute
dematerialization: absolute per capita dematerialization can only
occur if the growth rate of GDP per capita is smaller than –e / b
(minus the time trend coefficient divided by the income
coefficient). In the absence of the time trend, the condition for
absolute dematerialization would be b , 0 for any positive
economic growth rate, so this could be seen as an improvement:
the existence of a time trend allows for some positive economic
growth. This understanding of the time trend is confirmed by the
fact that the positive income coupling coefficient is always smaller
in the absence of the time trend, indicating that the time-related
effect mitigates the coupling between economic growth and
increases in material use. The limit on per capita economic growth
for dematerialization comes to 2.1% for total materials and to
1.8% for carbon dioxide, for the whole sample. Interestingly, these
rates are above the long term global average of 1.5% per capita
GDP growth. This paradox (no past dematerialization or
decarbonisation despite growth rates below the ‘‘upper limit’’) is
again due to the short-term nature of the panel analysis results,
indicating that the time trend and resulting upper limit to
economic growth compatible with dematerialization/decarbonisa-
tion can only be interpreted as a short term effect.
General Discussion
Taken together, our results are consistent with our hypothesis
that there exist significant differences in the economic dependency
for environmental resources between mature industrialized coun-
tries and their emerging or developing counterparts, despite the
great heterogeneity in material and economic development in each
group. The different analytical approaches employed provide
complementary insights into the complexity of the relation
between economic growth and resource use. In particular, the
expected result of higher material-economic coupling measured in
the developing/emerging country trajectories, contrasted with the
higher coupling measured for mature countries in the panel
analysis, show that the scale of time dependency shifts the result,
with the first type of coupling representing longer-term depen-
dency, and the second shorter-term. This type of distinction may
become quite important in understanding the environmental
implications of economic booms and crises, as well as longer term
growth, and may have policy important implications for guiding
economic development towards lower resource and emissions
intensity.
The implication and meaning of the highly significant time
trend seen in the panel analysis are extremely interesting. The time
trend can be understood as a short-term but steady shift in the
coupling of economic development and resource use over time,
corresponding to a shift in the overall income elasticity of the
relation (see for instance [58]). This type of shift over time has
been seen in life expectancy vs. income [59] and human
development vs. energy and carbon emissions [60], and is
generally interpreted as an improvement in the international
efficiency of producing desirable outcomes (economic or social) for
a given level of economic or material wealth.
The time trend may thus be interpreted as the ‘‘autonomous
technological progress’’ mirroring the constant improvement in
material productivity. However, as the current analysis shows,
increased material efficiency is by no means sufficient for absolute
decoupling between the economy and environmental resources.
Technological progress leads to economic growth, and might not
only be used to reduce resource consumption but also for
exploiting resources more intensively or cost-effectively. Indeed,
recent research into the role physical and technical factors of
production in economic growth has shown that technical efficiency
is a major factor of production, and can account for most of the
Solow Residual of traditional growth models [61]. The Solow
Residual, also known as Total Factor Productivity, measures the
gap between real growth and growth predicted based on increases
in labor and capital, and has often been interpreted as the
contribution of innovation. The role of technical progress in
driving economic growth may explain why, when we derive a
maximum income growth rate consistent with absolute demate-
rialization or decarbonization, this income growth rate is below
historic growth rates.
Conclusion and Next Steps
This study has established some key findings, and raised new
questions which need to be further explored by future research.
Key findings include that developing and emerging countries
indeed have a higher long term economic dependency on
materials and fossil fuels than mature economies, but the short
term economic-material coupling is paradoxically higher for
mature industrialized countries. EKC-like behavior, indicating a
slowing down of environmental resource use at higher incomes, is
only seen for the carbon emissions of the mature economies in our
sample, and we observe nothing consistent with an actual decline
at higher incomes. The idea to grow first and to deal with
environmental issues later has been proven false empirically. Its
appeal was and is based more in wishful thinking rather than
sound evidence.
For the first time, we observe a strong and significant negative
time trend, independent of income, for the total sample of
countries and all material categories and carbon emissions. We
can interpret this as a rate of ‘‘autonomous technical progress,’’
and it would be interesting to test this on other data sets and
with other complementary variables. If this time trend effect is
confirmed, and measurable as a long-term as well as short-term
effect, the finding would be extremely significant, since it would
allow to effectively set the pace for economic growth consistent
with absolute decarbonization and dematerialization. How does
this rate change if different forms of GDP (for instance
Purchasing Power Parity), or consumption-based material [27]
and carbon accounts [26] were used thereby acknowledging the
global characteristics of trade flows among countries? Do
consumption-based accounting measures diminish the differ-
ences observed between developing and industrialized econo-
mies? If we were to divide up the analysis into different time
periods, would we observe systematic trends in economic-
material coupling and the autonomous technical progress rates?
It may also be possible to conduct a parallel analysis on the
material and carbon intensities of these economies, which would
yield complementary insights.
A number of policy relevant conclusions can be drawn without
any further research. The most important is that current modes of
development, both for emerging and already industrialized
economies, are fundamentally unsustainable. There is no empir-
ical evidence for decarbonization or dematerialization at higher
economic growth rates or incomes. Global environmental
sustainability thus requires a fundamental shift away from
industrial development as usual. Recent initiatives focusing on
alternative forms of economic growth by new investment or
changing existing investment pathways in favor of a green
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economy, i.e. such economic activities that delivery goods and
services such as housing, mobility and food at a much lower
resource and emissions intensity [1], or challenging growth
altogether and prioritizing human well-being and non-resource-
intensive development [2], are thus necessary first steps towards
the radical change required to allow nine billion people to attain
high human development within planetary environmental limits
[60]. These initiatives translate into different policies for mature
industrialized countries, which must curb their consumption while
preserving and enhancing high living standards, and developing
and emerging countries, which should avoid the trap of resource-
intensive development. The international focus on human well-
being, rather than economic activity, as a development priority,
evidenced by the April 2012 ‘‘Happiness and Well-being: Defining
a New Economic Paradigm’’ United Nations conference in New
York, demonstrates that this necessity is starting to be acknowl-
edged at the highest level, although its translation into practical
policies is likely to be quite challenging.
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